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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
just result. The doctrine of constructive receipt should be sparingly applied and used by the Commissioner only in situations
where a taxpayer deviates from the normal course of action to
manipulate the year of receipt.
Richard C. Wagner
JURISDICTION -

SINGLE TRANSACTION HELD TO BE
"DOING BUSINESS"

Defendant foreign corporation sold machinery to plaintiff.
Defendant had taken the order through an independent broker,
recommended the manner of installation and sent a salesman to
investigate performance after installation. Nothing more was
done by defendant within the forum. Held (5-4): Defendant had
done business in the forum and was subject to its jurisdiction in
a breach of warranty suit. S. Howes Co. v. W. P. Milling Co.,
Okla. __, 277 P. 2d 655 (1954).
-

Prior to InternationalShoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U. S. 310
(1945), it was generally held that a single act by a foreign corporation within a state was insufficient to subject it to the in personam jurisdiction of the state. Rosenberg Bros. & Co. v. Curtis
Brown Co., 260 U. S. 516 (1923); Hunau v. Northern Region Supply Corp., 262 Fed. 181 (S. D. N. Y. 1920). To be subject to jurisdiction it must have engaged in such a continuous and regular
course of business that it was "present" in the state, International
Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U. S. 579 (1914); or that its consent to suit could be implied, Commercial Mutual Accident Co. v.
Davis, 213 U. S. 245 (1909). Incidental activities, such as mere
solicitation of business, were not sufficient to confer jurisdiction.
Green v. Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. Co., 205 U. S. 530 (1907) (railroad
with no tracks in state having an agent soliciting freight and passenger traffic) ; People's Tobacco Co. v. American Tobacco Co., 246
U. S. 79 (1918) (advertisement of products and agents with no
authority to take orders). However, solicitation by agents whose
orders were accepted outside the state and who had authority to
make collections amounted to "doing business." International
Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, supra; Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal
Co., 220 N. Y. 259, 115 N. E. 915 (1917).
The InternationalShoe case discarded the presence and consent theories and substituted a test of reasonableness. Due
process was held to be satisfied where the foreign corporation had
such minimum contacts with the state that the maintenance of
the suit did not offend traditional notions of fair play and sub-
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stantial justice. Any activity of a continuous sort regardless of
quantity or quality renders the corporation amenable to suit under
the InternationalShoe decision, resulting in the rejection of the
previous "mere solicitation" rule. French v. Gibbs Corp., 189
F. 2d 787 (2d Cir. 1951).
There remains some question, however, as to whether a single
act is a sufficient basis for jurisdiction under the new jurisdictional
test. Johns v. Bay State Abrasive Products Co., 89 F. Supp. 654
(D. Md. 1950). But a single tort within the jurisdiction was held
sufficient by the Supreme Court of Vermont. Smyth v. Twin State
Improvement Corp., 116 Vt. 569, 80 A. 2d 664 (1951). Where
there were additional contacts sufficient to meet the "reasonableness" test, suit brought on a contract made in the forum
under a statute subjecting a corporation to jurisdiction on the
basis of a single act has been allowed. CornpaniaDe Astral, S. A.
v. Boston Metals Co., __ Md. ,107 A. 2d 357 (1954). However,
the "reasonableness" test was held not to be met where the contract was not consummated in the state, the requirements of the
jurisdictional statute thereby not being fulfilled. Park Beverage
Co. v. Goebel Brewing Co., 197 Md. 369, 79 A. 2d 157 (1951).
Some jurisdictions have upheld the validity of statutes allowing suits against insurance corporations on the basis of a single
contract in the state. Kaye v. Doe, 204 Misc. 719, 125 N. Y. S. 2d
135 (Sup. Ct. 1953); Parmalee v. Iowa State Traveling Men's
Ass'*., 206 F. 2d 518 (5th Cir. 1953).
In the instant case the majority cites the InternationalShoe
case to support the decision, specifically noting that the test, as
outlined by the Supreme Court, is qualitative, rather than quantitative or mechanical. The test laid down in the InternationalShoe
decision, although not yet well-defined by the decisions, would
appear to hold due process met when jurisdiction is based on a
single act and circumstances are such that it is not unreasonable
to require the corporation to defend in the forum. Two factors
which appear to determine "reasonableness", applicability of the
law of the forum and availability of witnesses, are absent in the
instant case. Present, however, is the factor that the cause of
action arose out of the corporation's business in the forum.
In view of the diminishing requirements for jurisdiction, as
evidenced by the InternationalShoe case, it would appear that
state court decisions sustaining jurisdiction on the basis of a single act would be upheld by the Supreme Court where the power
of the state is not arbitrarily exercised.
Eileen Tomaka

